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Abstract
Despite pleas from international organizations, governments
and trade economists to refrain from imposing trade‐
distorting measures, over 20 countries have implemented
bans on the export of agri‐food products since the onset of
the COVID‐19 crisis. These export prohibitions might ad-
versely impact food security and disrupt well‐established
global supply chains. We identify importing countries that
could potentially be affected by the imposed export bans
using a measure of their import dependency during the pre‐
pandemic period to illustrate our results on global trade maps.
We find that many importers rely on just one country for a
significant share of the overall domestic supply of a particular
commodity. [EconLit Citations: F10, F13, Q17, Q18]
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Government authorities worldwide responded swiftly to the COVID‐19 pandemic and enacted temporary trade
measures aiming at stabilizing domestic food prices and ensuring domestic food security. As of mid‐June 2020,
over 150 countries have put trade measures into force, mainly involving vital medical supplies, while according to
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the International Trade Center (ITC), 23 countries have banned exports of agri‐food products (ITC, 2020).
For instance, on March 31st, 2020, Belarus imposed restrictions on all exports of buckwheat, onions, and garlic,
while at the beginning of April, Cambodia and Myanmar prohibited the export of rice. This tendency contradicts
pleas from several international organizations, governments, and trade economists to let food move freely across
borders without restrictions, insofar as compliance with existing food safety standards is ensured (FAO, IFAD,
WFP, and the World Bank, 2020).1 In this context, research on the impact of export restrictions imposed tem-
porarily as a reaction to the COVID‐19 pandemic on trade flows, food prices and food security, especially in
affected importing countries, is of high policy relevance.
In this paper, we focus on the potential implications of temporary export bans on agri‐food commodities during
the COVID‐19 pandemic for importing countries, based on pre‐pandemic trade flows.2 The impact of an export ban
on an importing country is strongly determined by its import dependency (Deuss, 2017). Therefore, we calculate past
import dependencies for trade partners of countries imposing temporary export bans on agri‐food products during
the pandemic. Based on the results, we then compile maps to illustrate potential disruptions of the importers' supply
of the commodity under consideration. Our objective is to identify cases requiring further analysis with respect to the
impacts of COVID‐19‐related temporary export bans on social welfare and food security. We do not conduct an
impact analysis to derive precise implications for trade flows, prices and food security in the importing countries.
As of mid‐June 2020, 23 countries have implemented 104 prohibitions on agri‐food exports (ITC, 2020). While the
number of newly adopted trade measures has decreased in the meantime (Joller & Kniahin, 2020), concerns remain as
restrictions in place are not lifted promptly. In addition, previous research shows that, although export bans might be
lifted after a few weeks, their effects can be long lasting (e.g., Deuss, 2017). While both temporary export and
temporary import measures are designed to ensure domestic food security, a liberalization of imports implies higher
trade flows and a convergence of domestic to world market prices in the respective country and gives exporters
access to new markets. Moreover, an import ban can also aim at stabilizing domestic farm incomes (Larue & Ker,
1993). In contrast, export bans are intended to isolate the enacting country's markets from international price
fluctuations, which gained prominence during the 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 food price crises (see e.g., Diao &
Kennedy, 2016; Djuric et al., 2015; Tangermann, 2011b). At the same time, such measures can lead to severe issues in
terms of rising world market prices as well as insufficient supply of affordable food for dependent trade partners
(Martin & Anderson, 2012).3 In particular, export restrictions can affect developing countries that rely heavily on
imports from the country imposing the ban and where significant food price increases can have severe impacts on
overall poverty (Anania, 2013; Deuss, 2017; Ivanic & Martin, 2008; Sharma, 2011). These adverse effects of export
restrictions have led to an intensive debate on how to curb such measures (Tangermann, 2011b). Note that while both
restrictive measures related to imports and export subsidies have been strictly regulated through the eighth round of
multilateral trade negotiations (Uruguay Round) this does not apply to export restrictions (Tangermann, 2011b).
Our analysis contributes to a better understanding of the potential disruptions that temporary export bans on
agri‐food products may provoke in importing countries during times of a global pandemic by considering the
affected countries' dependency on imports. In doing so, we identify which countries are likely most severely
affected using trade flow data from the pre‐pandemic period. We assume that pre‐COVID‐19 import dependency
is strongly related to dependency during and after the pandemic. The results can therefore be of interest for
further research involving impact analyses of temporary export prohibitions (e.g., Kerr, 2020) as they help identify
1Food export restrictions were also among the measures discussed at the G20 Extraordinary Agriculture Ministers Meeting on April 21st, 2020, and at a
special meeting of the WTO's regular Committee on Agriculture on June 18th, held to review the measures introduced by governments since the COVID‐
19 outbreak.
2Note that in our analysis we include all importing countries regardless of their domestic production quantities w.r.t. a specific commodity or the degree
of re‐exporting.
3Research has also shown that domestic agricultural policies do not necessarily destabilize world prices if effective combinations of multiple measures are
used (Zwart & Blandford, 1989). Moreover, several studies have shown that the extent of adverse effects depends on the combination of the trade
restrictions applied and the size of the country applying them (e.g., Larue & Ker, 1993; Zwart & Blandford, 1989).
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relevant cases with respect to potential effects on social welfare and food security and can aid the development
policies aimed at increasing food self‐sufficiency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section, Section 2, gives an overview of the related
literature. In Section 3, we introduce the methodological framework and present the data. The empirical results are
presented and discussed in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we present some conclusions and the implications for
further research that can be derived from our findings.
2 | LITERATURE BACKGROUND
Short‐term export bans on agri‐food products gained prominence during the 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 food price
crises as a potential measure to stabilize prices of staple foods and promote domestic food security (Martin &
Anderson, 2012; Porteous, 2017; Sharma, 2011). However, export restrictions on agricultural commodities have
also been identified as a major driver of these crises as they increased world market price volatility (Liefert et al.,
2012; Martin & Anderson, 2012; Sharma, 2011). For example, Martin and Anderson (2012) find that trade re-
strictions contributed substantially to the 2007/2008 price increases with the limitations resulting in 45% and 30%
of the increase in world market prices for rice and wheat, respectively. Accordingly, Tangermann (2011a) indicates
that export restrictions in reaction to crop shortfalls were a major cause of the 2010/2011 price spikes on grain
markets (Tangermann, 2011a).
Similar consequences may be anticipated for bans imposed during the COVID‐19 pandemic (Barichello, 2020;
Glauber et al., 2020). Nevertheless, we expect that the effects of temporary export bans on agri‐food products
during the 2020 COVID‐19 pandemic will differ in several ways from those experienced during the 2007/2008 and
2010/2011 food price crises. Key differences in the underlying context include the fact that production levels of
major staples are above the average of the past 5 years, oil prices are low, and global stock levels of major grains in
relation to consumption are 70%–100% higher than in the early 2000s (Espitia et al., 2020; Martin & Glauber,
2020; Voegele, 2020). Compared to 2007/2008, global food prices have been relatively stable in recent years and
they remained low in the first months of 2020 (Voegele, 2020). Moreover, new issues have arisen during the
COVID‐19 pandemic that did not play a role in earlier crises. These include the supply‐side disruption of access to
labor (Hobbs; Larue, 2020; Ridley & Devadoss, 2020) or demand‐side shocks such as panic purchases and hoarding
of essential, durable food products (Hobbs, 2020).
In previous research, impact analyses often rely on gravity models to evaluate the ultimate effect of an export
ban on trade flows and social welfare in exporting and importing countries (e.g., Cheptea & Gaigné, 2020; Zongo &
Larue, 2019). Various effects have been identified concerning the impact of an export ban on both the individual
countries imposing the ban and the importing countries affected (e.g., Martin & Anderson, 2012). For the exporting
country, some studies find that an export ban can shield domestic prices from world market prices and dampen
domestic price volatility. For example, the Russian wheat export ban in 2010/2011 resulted in Russian domestic
wheat prices between 35% and 67% lower compared to the situation where no ban was imposed, with significant
variations across regions (Götz et al., 2016). In contrast, other studies have detected no, or even opposite, effects
on price levels and volatility. For example, Djuric et al. (2015) analyze the Serbian wheat export ban in 2007 and
find that the ban did not succeed in reducing the volatility and absolute value of domestic prices. The latter even
rose above world market price levels, for example, in April 2008 the wheat price in Serbia was approximately
440 Euros per metric ton while the world market price was 360 Euros per metric ton (Djuric et al., 2015).
Moreover, Liefert et al. (2012) show that producers in those countries imposing export restrictions are adversely
affected by an export ban since they (i) are forced to sell at domestic price levels, which are below world market
prices, and (ii) must reduce their production quantities as they only have to meet domestic requirements and there
is no export demand.
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In the case of importers, which are the main focus of this article, the negative consequences of temporary
export restrictions imposed by trade partners are expected to be stronger for countries with a high import
dependency and inversely related to the substitutability of a commodity (Deuss, 2017). For instance, Deuss (2017)
finds that after the Vietnamese rice export ban in 2007, the degree of price transmission from world market to
domestic prices decreased by 49.4 percentage points (p.p.) compared to the pre‐ban status for those importers
with high dependency (e.g., Cameroon, Senegal, or Côte d′Ivoire) In contrast, importers with low dependency
(e.g., Benin, South Africa, or Peru) exhibit no significant change in the price transmission process.
3 | METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A country's dependency on imports (or a lack thereof) has been identified in the food security literature via the
food self‐sufficiency ratio (SSR; e.g., Clapp, 2017; Puma et al., 2015). The SSR measures the share of food produced
domestically in a country's total supply of food, where food supply equals the sum of domestic production
and imports, minus exports plus changes in stock (FAO, 2012). The lower the SSR, the more a country relies on
food imports to cover domestic food consumption. The SSR can be defined on the commodity/product level, or for
food in general based on each commodity's caloric contribution.
We use a measure of import dependency (ID), which can be derived as 1‐SSR, given that exports of the
importing country are zero, to identify potential disruptions of a (temporary) export ban imposed by a particular
country on importing trade partners. However, calculating the ID as 1‐SSR does not indicate on which trade
partner the importing country relies or the degree to which it relies on a particular trade partner. To obtain a
measure of a country's ID with respect to each trade partner who has banned exports for a specific product during








where i denotes the importing country, j denotes the product, and k denotes the exporting country. Q is i's
imported quantity of product j with origin k while FS represents the total food supply of product j in the importing
country i. That is, for each food product under an export ban, we compute the share of imports from the prohibiting
country in the total supply of that product in the importing country. Total food supply is defined as domestic
production of agri‐food product j in country i, plus imports minus exports plus changes in stock (FAO, 2020a; Puma
et al., 2015). We calculate median IDs over the three precrisis years 2015, 2016, and 20174 to obtain an estimate
of the ID, which is not driven by exceptional events in a single year.
To derive the IDs, we first identify all COVID‐19 export bans on agri‐food products using the ITC Market
Access Map COVID‐19 (ITC, 2020). We compile data on the enacting country, affected products, affected coun-
tries, start date and end date if known for each of the 1045 export prohibition measures imposed (see Table A1 in
the online appendix for the complete list of agri‐food export bans imposed).
We then use the UN Comtrade database (United Nations, 2020) to compile data on imports of the affected
agri‐food products (variable Q in Equation 1). Product selection is based on Harmonized System (HS) codes.6
The ITC Market Access Map COVID‐19 only provides the product name but not the corresponding HS code for
some commodities subject to an export ban. The UN Comtrade database was scanned for the names of these
4More recent data on food supply was not available at the time of analysis.
5We count each ban imposed by the Eurasian Economic Union as a single ban for each country since some of the countries such as Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan have imposed additional restrictions, partly on the same commodities. For ease of interpretation, we also present the results for each country
separately.
6The Harmonized System (HS) is a globally adopted classification system for products and product groups.
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products to check whether there is an exact match of the product defined by ITC and products defined according
to the HS. We used the corresponding HS code from UN Comtrade to obtain exact matches. Sixteen country‐
product combinations have been excluded as we could not identify a match in the HS.7 Moreover, trade data for
Tajikistan (eight bans) are not available on UN Comtrade.
We obtain data on total food supply (FS) for the importing countries based on the selected commodity groups
from FAOSTAT (FAO, 2020a). It is not possible to compute the ID for some countries over all three precrisis years
due to the absence of food supply data for this period, or because no imports were reported on UN Comtrade.
In these cases, we use the median ID of 2 years or the value of the 1 year available, respectively. Since the UN
Comtrade database only contains data up to the 6‐digit level,8 we exclude 22 export bans referring to the 8‐digit
level. Moreover, the FAO does not publish the corresponding data applying to 22 bans on buckwheat, carrots,
garlic, and pasta. In the case of a further 17 bans, it appears that no country imported that particular product in the
2015–2017 period. This led to a final number of 21 export bans for agricultural commodities (out of 104) imposed
by 11 countries that are included in the analysis (Table 1). Note that Table 1 already contains the imputed HS
codes for commodities for which we have found an exact match in UN Comtrade while Table A2 in the online
appendix contains the original data from ITC. Moreover, in the case of the bans imposed by the Eurasian Economic
Union (EAEU), we show the results for each member state, since some of them, for example, Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan have installed additional export restrictions, partly covering the same commodities.
The 21 bans included lead to 399 median IDs, each reflecting an importer–exporter pair (see Table A2 in the online
appendix). The IDs are illustrated using global trade maps (Figures 1–5 and Figure A1 in the online appendix). We discuss
the results for export bans affecting at least one importer with a median import dependency of at least 20% since these
cases would be of interest for future, in‐depth research investigating the potential impacts on social welfare and food
security in the importing countries. This includes Cambodia/Myanmar (rice), Russia (millet, rice, and soy), Romania (cereals,
outside European Economic Area [EEA]), Kazakhstan (soy), and Sudan (sorghum).
4 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Our results are presented in Tables 2–6 and the global trade maps (Figures 1–5). Tables 2–6 include the minimum,
median, and maximum ID values for the top 10 importers of the eight examples selected, while Figures 1–5 show
the global trade maps where at least one importer has an ID > 20%. Given the potential relevance of the eight
examples for social welfare and food security in the importing countries, we discuss them in greater detail below.9
In general, we observe heterogeneous results depending on the ban imposed and the countries involved. In some
cases, a large number of countries have been importing the respective commodity, but at low rates in relation to
the importers' domestic supply quantities (e.g., Philippines [rice]; cf. Figure A1 and Table A2 in the online appendix).
However, in other cases, only a small number of countries has been importing the commodity, whereby they
depend heavily on these imports as indicated by large median ID values (e.g., Russia [soy]; cf. Figure 2 and Table 3).
We find that several European countries are highly dependent on rice imports from Cambodia and Myanmar with
ID values up to 90% during the precrisis period (cf. Figure 1 and Table 2). The Czech Republic (21.86%), the Netherlands
7These are Algeria (food products), Cambodia (fish), Egypt (beans, peas), Jordan (food products), Kazakhstan (white sugar, white and red cabbages),
Kuwait (foodstuffs), Mali (food products), Oman (flour and wheat), Pakistan (food products), Romania (flour, sugar, vegetable oil), Russia ((processed)
grain), and the Syrian Arab Republic (food commodities).
8The number of digits of an HS code increases with the level of disaggregation. For instance, 10 is the code for cereals, 1001 is the code for cereals: wheat
and meslin, 100119 is the code for cereals: wheat and meslin: durum wheat: other than seed. Moreover, individual countries can add further digits to
disaggregate 6‐digit classifications beyond the 6‐digit level in their tariff schedules. However, these are not standardized across all countries, and it is
therefore not possible to include them in UN Comtrade.
9Table A2 contains the ID values for all 21 export bans and Figure A1 in the online appendix shows the remaining trade maps where the ID for all
importing countries is <20%.
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F IGURE 1 Dependency on rice imports (share of imports in total food supply) from Cambodia and Myanmar by
exporter and importer [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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F IGURE 2 Dependency on imports (share of imports in total food supply) from Russia by commodity and importer
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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(22.28%), Poland (28.11%), and Croatia (29.99%) imported between one‐fifth and one‐third of their rice supply from
Cambodia, while the Latvian ID with respect to rice imports from Cambodia is highest with 58.5%. On average, Belgium
and Lithuania imported 90.13% and 29.72% of their respective total rice supply during the precrisis period from
Myanmar. Moreover, Poland (17.88%), the Netherlands (11%), and Latvia (9.69%) are among the top five importers of
rice fromMyanmar in terms of their ID (cf. Figure 1 and Table 2). The ID values for importers of rice from the Philippines
are below 1% for all importing countries (cf. Figure A1 and Table A2 in the online appendix). Note that the Philippines
have banned rice exports despite being one of the world's largest rice producers (FAO, 2020b). However, in contrast to
Cambodia andMyanmar, the Philippines are not a major rice exporter, but were the world's largest rice importer in 2019
illustrating the country's own requirements for this commodity (United Nations, 2020).
A large difference between the maximum and the minimum ID measure indicates that the importing country
has been able to switch smoothly between sources for the commodity under consideration in the past, while a
small difference points toward well‐established trading relationships and a higher dependency. The difference
between the maximum and minimum ID is over 10 p.p.10 in the case of five countries that import rice from
F IGURE 3 Dependency on cereal imports (share of imports in total food supply) from Romania by the importer
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
10We focus on absolute changes, that is, percentage points, rather than relative changes, that is, percentages, since relative changes do not reveal much
about flexibility. For instance, consider country A having a minimum ID of 1% and a maximum ID of 2%, and country B with a minimum ID of 20% and a
maximum of 40%. Both countries exhibit a relative difference of 100% between minimum and maximum but they are hardly comparable since the overall
level of dependence is completely different.
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Cambodia (Lithuania 18.90 p.p., Croatia 13.94 p.p., Estonia 13.81 p.p., Poland 13.68 p.p., and the Netherlands
12.33 p.p.), and three countries that import rice for Myanmar (Belgium 79.16 p.p., Lithuania 39.41 p.p., and Bulgaria
16.60 p.p.; cf. Table 2). Hence, although the majority of the aforementioned countries are among the most
dependent in terms of the median ID, our findings suggest a certain degree of flexibility in the sourcing of rice.
Therefore, although the bans on rice exports imposed by Cambodia and the Philippines mainly affect higher
income European countries that can be expected to adapt more ably to any potentially detrimental impacts, these
export bans could still create trade distortions between some major Asian producers of staple crops and Europe.
First, European countries might switch sources, which could involve higher transaction costs and thereby lead to
higher prices for consumers. Second, producers and exporting companies could lose their access to the European
market if the importing countries stick to the alternative sources they switched to while the ban was in place.
Moreover, the high ID values for Belgium and the Netherlands are also driven by the fact that both countries are
among the largest transshipment points for goods in Europe (Eurostat, 2020). Future studies examining the impact
of the export bans of Cambodia and Myanmar should therefore also consider the potential impact on third
countries, such as France or Germany, which traditionally rely heavily on importing Belgian and Dutch rice
re‐exports (United Nations, 2020).
In the case of Russian export bans on millet, rice, and soy, we find the highest median ID values for countries
located close to Russia (Figure 2 and Table 3). In terms of the ID, Azerbaijan (109.41%) is most heavily dependent
F IGURE 4 Dependency on soy imports (share of imports in total food supply) from Kazakhstan by the importer
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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on rice imports from Russia, followed by Mongolia (38.47%) and Moldova (24.62%). We observe the fourth and
fifth largest median IDs for Georgia (5.86%) and Switzerland (5.85%), which are already below 10%. Azerbaijan is
not only the most heavily dependent rice importer but also the most dependent importer of soy (70.21%;
cf. Figure 2 and Table 3). In this case, Ireland has the second largest ID (44.01%) while all other countries have IDs
below one percent. Mongolia (98.69%), Serbia (65.81%), and Turkey (54.44%) imported over 50% of their millet
supply from Russia. In addition, Azerbaijan (22.21%), Thailand (20.86%), and Iran (20.41%) show high median ID
values of slightly above a fifth. Hence, we see that Azerbaijan (rice, soy, and millet) and Mongolia (rice and millet) in
particular are highly dependent on imports from Russia.
As regards sourcing flexibility, compared to the bans for rice of Cambodia and Myanmar, the variation of the
ID is larger for the Russian bans (cf. Table 2 and Table 3). Table 3 illustrates that in the case of millet, rice, and soy:
There are 13 countries with a difference between the maximum and minimum ID of over 10 p.p., namely Azer-
baijan 83.17 p.p., Serbia 80.70 p.p., Mongolia 52.49 p.p., Turkey 37.00 p.p., Germany 16.87 p.p., United Kingdom
14.23 p.p., the Netherlands 12.38 p.p., South Africa 10.68 p.p. for millet, Azerbaijan 54.95 p.p., Mongolia 46.67 p.p.,
Moldova 22.67 p.p., Belgium 19.24 p.p. for rice, and Azerbaijan 102.28 p.p. for rice. Moreover, in seven of these
13 cases, the minimum ID is well below 10% suggesting a higher degree of sourcing flexibility and a lower
dependency on imports from Russia (cf. Table 3). The large variation in the ID indicates sourcing flexibility for
Azerbaijan and Mongolia. However, the minimum IDs amount to 11.82% and 84.53% for millet and 55.05% and
F IGURE 5 Dependency on sorghum imports (share of imports in total food supply) from Sudan by the importer
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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16.06% for rice, respectively. Therefore, these two countries might be particularly vulnerable to adverse effects
resulting from the Russian export bans.
We find that most of the countries with the highest ID values resulting from Romania's ban on cereal exports
outside of the EEA are located on the Arabian Peninsula (e.g., Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates)
and in northern Africa (e.g., Mauritania, Sudan, Tunisia) (Figure 3 and Table 4). Crop production is challenging in
these regions due to climatic constraints, the most important being water shortage (Fader et al., 2013). However,
only Jordan shows a median ID exceeding 20% (26.12%) followed by Mauritania (5.86%), Lebanon (3.86%), and the
United Arab Emirates (3.80%; Figure 3 and Table 4). With a minimum ID of 19.28% (2017), Jordan imported at
least one‐fifth of its cereals supply from Romania in the precrisis period (2015–2017). Indeed, it was Jordan's
largest trade partner for cereals in 2015 and 2016 and second only to the United States in 2017 (United Nations,
2020). Although the ban was lifted on April 16, 2020, just 6 days after it was imposed, the major role played by
Romania in Jordan's cereals supply in previous years might lead the Jordanian government to reconsider the
sourcing of cereals in the future. As efforts to expand domestic production would be very costly (if at all possible)
due to the natural constraints in Jordan (Fader et al., 2013), greater diversification of the set of trade partners
might be an appealing option.
TABLE 2 Top 10 importers of rice from Cambodia and Myanmar by import dependency
Rank Importer Exporter Median ID (%) Minimum ID (%) Maximum ID (%) Range (p.p.)
1 Latvia Cambodia 58.500 54.000 58.750 4.750
2 Croatia Cambodia 29.993 23.024 36.963 12.939
3 Poland Cambodia 28.111 17.711 31.394 13.683
4 Netherlands Cambodia 22.281 19.880 32.206 12.326
5 Czechia Cambodia 21.863 18.397 24.152 5.755
6 Lithuania Cambodia 20.411 19.470 38.367 18.897
7 Germany Cambodia 16.518 15.045 22.129 7.084
8 Estonia Cambodia 12.672 10.494 24.302 13.808
9 Bulgaria Cambodia 12.087 8.889 18.833 9.944
10 France Cambodia 11.918 11.204 12.169 0.965
1 Belgium Myanmar 90.127 51.054 130.214 79.160
2 Lithuania Myanmar 29.722 24.200 63.611 39.411
3 Poland Myanmar 17.876 12.383 19.562 7.179
4 Netherlands Myanmar 11.004 8.968 17.414 8.446
5 Latvia Myanmar 9.688 5.000 14.375 9.375
6 Burkina Faso Myanmar 7.018 3.069 10.967 7.898
7 Germany Myanmar 6.951 6.023 7.628 1.605
8 Czechia Myanmar 6.514 5.648 11.659 6.011
9 Croatia Myanmar 5.643 2.045 9.241 7.196
10 Bulgaria Myanmar 4.196 2.966 19.565 16.599
Note: The complete data are given in Table A2 in the online appendix.
Abbreviations: ID,import dependency; p.p., percentage points.
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As regards Kazakhstan's ban on soy exports, Azerbaijan and Sweden exhibit median IDs of 32.09% and
12.17%, respectively (Figure 4 and Table 5). Sweden is the only country reporting imports of soy from Kazakhstan
throughout the entire period (2015–2017; cf. Table 5). All other countries only imported soy from Kazakhstan in
1 of the 3 years considered. Therefore, the dependence on soy imports from Kazakhstan in other countries is quite
TABLE 3 Top 10 importers for rice, soy, and millet from Russia by import dependency
Rank Importer Commodity Median ID (%) Minimum ID (%) Maximum ID (%) Range (p.p.)
1 Azerbaijan Rice 109.406 55.046 109.992 54.946
2 Mongolia Rice 38.474 16.046 62.712 46.666
3 Rep. of Moldova Rice 24.624 4.296 26.967 22.671
4 Georgia Rice 5.856 4.947 10.605 5.658
5 Switzerland Rice 5.848 n.a. n.a. n.a.
6 Lebanon Rice 3.827 1.685 5.179 3.494
7 Turkey Rice 3.742 3.344 7.024 3.680
8 Latvia Rice 2.015 2.008 3.009 1.001
9 Sudan Rice 1.364 0.527 2.202 1.675
10 Ukraine Rice 0.994 0.410 1.249 0.839
1 Azerbaijan Soy 70.207 0.919 103.196 102.277
2 Ireland Soy 44.011 40.976 47.045 6.069
3 Belgium Soy 0.450 n.a. n.a. n.a.
4 China Soy 0.408 0.394 0.474 0.080
5 Turkey Soy 0.185 0.119 0.223 0.104
6 Iran Soy 0.178 n.a. n.a. n.a.
7 Canada Soy 0.082 <0.001 0.165 0.165
8 Rep. of Korea Soy 0.048 0.047 0.108 0.061
9 Germany Soy 0.020 <0.001 0.027 0.027
10 Poland Soy 0.013 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1 Mongolia Millet 98.689 84.527 137.017 52.490
2 Serbia Millet 65.812 18.407 99.105 80.698
3 Turkey Millet 54.443 20.296 57.296 37.000
4 Azerbaijan Millet 22.214 11.814 94.982 83.168
5 Thailand Millet 20.861 20.667 28.345 7.678
6 Iran Millet 20.408 16.817 23.999 7.182
7 Brazil Millet 11.500 n.a. n.a. n.a.
8 Jordan Millet 10.915 n.a. n.a. n.a.
9 United Kingdom Millet 10.700 3.587 17.813 14.226
10 Netherlands Millet 9.210 3.019 15.400 12.381
Note: The complete data are given in Table A2 in the online appendix.
Abbreviations: ID, import dependency; n.a., not applicable; p.p., percentage points.
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low with only a few countries importing significant shares of their soy supply. This is similar to the case of Russia,
where only two countries show median IDs of over 1% (cf. Figure 2 and Table 3). However, this must be put into
perspective against the share in global production. While Kazakhstan and Russia produced approximately 255,000
and 4 million tonnes of soy in 2018, respectively, global production amounted 363 million tonnes, of which 66%
was produced solely by the United States and Brazil (FAO, 2020b). Since the USA and Brazil are also the world's
top soy exporters (United Nations, 2020), it is not surprising that only few countries depend on soy imports from
Kazakhstan and Russia.
Lastly, we present the results of Sudan's ban on sorghum exports. As a developing country, Kenya shows a
median import dependency of 38.42%, while Lebanon's dependency is even higher with a share of 56.32% of its
sorghum supply stemming from Sudan (Figure 5 and Table 6). However, both countries only report sorghum
TABLE 4 Top 10 importers for cereals from Romania by import dependency
Rank Importer Median ID (%) Minimum ID (%) Maximum ID (%) Range (p.p.)
1 Jordan 26.116 19.283 53.623 34.340
2 Mauritania 5.863 n.a. n.a. n.a.
3 Lebanon 3.863 3.259 6.934 3.675
4 United Arab Emirates 3.798 1.114 5.557 4.443
5 Sudan 3.556 3.257 3.854 0.597
6 Saudi Arabia 2.534 2.158 3.356 1.198
7 Tunisia 2.450 1.349 3.531 2.182
8 New Zealand 1.980 n.a. n.a. n.a.
9 Egypt 1.602 <0.001 3.204 3.204
10 Oman 1.304 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: The complete data are given in Table A2 in the online appendix.
Abbreviations: ID, import dependency; n.a., not applicable; p.p., percentage points.
TABLE 5 Importers for soy from Kazakhstan by import dependency
Rank Importer Median ID (%) Minimum ID (%) Maximum ID (%) Range (p.p.)
1 Azerbaijan 32.093 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2 Sweden 12.168 10.560 24.915 14.355
3 Denmark 8.400 n.a. n.a. n.a.
4 Turkey 0.282 n.a. n.a. n.a.
5 USA 0.028 n.a. n.a. n.a.
6 China 0.006 n.a. n.a. n.a.
7 Canada 0.002 n.a. n.a. n.a.
8 Lebanon 0.001 n.a. n.a. n.a.
9 Netherlands <0.001 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: The complete data are given in Table A2 in the online appendix.
Abbreviations: ID, import dependency; n.a., not applicable; p.p., percentage points.
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imports from Sudan in 2017. Hence, they are able to satisfy the domestic demand from other sources as well.
The United Arab Emirates have a median ID of 26.47% followed by Belgium with 14.49% and Spain with 13.81%.
While all of them report sorghum imports from Sudan more than once, the minimum IDs are either below 10%
(Belgium and Spain) or the difference between the maximum and minimum is very large (United Arab Emirates)
suggesting that the importers are very flexible in sourcing sorghum from other countries (Table 6). In addition,
while Sudan was the third largest producer of sorghum in 2018 with a volume of approximately 5 million tonnes
(behind the United States and Nigeria), only 77,000 tonnes were exported, which is <2% of its production (FAO,
2020b; United Nations, 2020). In contrast, the United States produced slightly over 9million tonnes and exported
approximately 4million tonnes in 2018, which is equivalent to 44% (FAO, 2020b; United Nations, 2020). It follows
that most of Sudan's sorghum production is used for domestic consumption and only small shares are exported,
potentially making Sudan unattractive as a trade partner for sorghum imports.
5 | CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this study, we identify potential disruptions in the food supply of importing countries caused by temporary
export bans enacted in reaction of the COVID‐19 pandemic using pre‐pandemic trade flows. We use data from the
ITC, UN Comtrade, and the FAO to calculate an import dependency measure and evaluate the historic reliance of
importing countries on those countries restricting exports and provide examples from both developed and
developing countries.
We find that importers often rely on a particular trade partner for a significant share of the supply of a given
commodity. These countries are particularly vulnerable to sudden export restrictions imposed by their main trade
partners, even if these restrictions are only a temporary measure. However, the implications for importing
countries are more complex. The ultimate impact on the trade partners of countries which impose export bans is
determined by several other factors, such as further COVID‐19‐related supply‐ and demand‐side issues, the
commodity's share in the country's total domestic caloric supply, or its access to alternative trade partners to
source the commodity. Nevertheless, and especially from a short‐term point of view, every export ban is likely to
distort supply chains that rely heavily on imports from a particular country.
TABLE 6 Top 10 importers for sorghum from Sudan by import dependency
Rank Importer Median ID (%) Minimum ID (%) Maximum ID (%) Range (p.p.)
1 Lebanon 56.318 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2 Kenya 38.421 n.a. n.a. n.a.
3 United Arab Emirates 26.474 15.841 211.218 195.377
4 Belgium 14.488 9.735 15.631 5.896
5 Spain 13.809 0.004 27.613 27.609
6 Netherlands 6.430 4.706 8.153 3.447
7 Jordan 6.284 1.636 10.931 9.295
8 Greece 4.500 n.a. n.a. n.a.
9 Italy 4.038 0.009 8.067 8.058
10 Germany 3.845 3.357 5.716 2.359
Note: The complete data are given in Table A2 in the online appendix.
Abbreviations: ID, import dependency; n.a., not applicable; p.p., percentage points.
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Based on these findings, we encourage future researchers to use the cases/dependencies identified in our
study as a starting point for further analyses of the effects of COVID‐19‐related export bans on the importing and
exporting countries and to include third countries, which might be affected, for example, due to world market price
fluctuations. Our results indicate that the comparability of different country/commodity combinations is limited,
so that further investigations should be conducted case‐by‐case. In addition, it would be valuable to examine
whether countries which have made efforts to increase their food self‐sufficiency after the food price crisis
2007/2008, have been successful and improved the resilience of their food systems against such risks. We
recognize that import dependency is a first indication of the varying extents to which countries seek to satisfy the
quantity and diversity of the food demands of their population. However, a more nuanced understanding of food
self‐sufficiency and how it is impacted by temporary trade restrictions could lead to a more targeted policy
dialogue (Clapp, 2017). To this end, our analysis could be extended using alternative indices to capture the link
between trade and food and nutrition security in importing countries. Finally, it might be interesting to investigate
further how high‐income countries such as Belgium or the Netherlands have responded to the lack or reduction of
supplies from their traditional main trade partners.
When considering the consequences of export bans on food security in importing countries, there may be
doubts as to whether a lack of imports from, for example, Myanmar (rice) or Russia (soy) jeopardizes the avail-
ability of an adequate caloric supply for the population in Europe. Firstly, there might be alternative suppliers for
the respective commodity, such as China in the case of rice. Secondly, the contribution of a product to the overall
caloric food supply must be taken into consideration when drawing conclusions on the impact of the trade
measures on food security. Nevertheless, if a country sources a high share of any commodity from just one
producer, and all imports of the commodity are suddenly stopped, this will probably distort well‐established and
coordinated global supply chains in both developing and industrialized countries—at least in the short term.
Another potential implication is rising world market prices, especially for thinly traded commodities, that is,
commodities where a small number of producers supply most of the global production and small shares of this
global production are traded, such as rice (Clapp, 2017). Coinciding with the imposition of most of the trade
measures, world market prices for rice rose by over 25 p.p. between February and April 2020 (World Bank, 2020).
Hence, third countries might be effected by import bans due to increments of market prices, which in turn can
jeopardize food security in poorer countries (Baquedano & Liefert, 2014). Moreover, in the absence of affordable
substitutes, the ban on the export of cereals from Romania might very well cause issues regarding food security for
its trade partners, particularly in the short‐term and in countries like Jordan, which lack natural resources to
expand domestic production.
Lastly, we present a brief discussion of aspects that future research should highlight when quantifying the
impact of export bans on importing countries. In general, when reviewing the impact of the export bans on prices,
production, and trade, there are several other issues in the context of the COVID‐19 pandemic that affected the
global food systems, which need to be considered complementarily with export bans. First, supply‐side access to
labor for the primary production of crops relying on a seasonal workforce has been disrupted due to travel
restrictions (Larue, 2020; Ridley & Devadoss, 2020). Food processing and retailing have also been affected by
worker illness and restrictions in public life (Hobbs, 2020). Second, a phenomenon observed in many different
countries at the beginning of the crisis involved panic purchases and hoarding of essential durable food products,
for example, flour, pasta, and rice, producing a strong demand‐side shock which, in some cases, led to empty
supermarket shelves (Hobbs, 2020). Third, countries with a historically high tourist volume might be facing very
different food demand patterns during the crisis compared to previous years since the absence of tourists leads to
a decline in demand from the hospitality industry. Fourth, the COVID‐19 pandemic has led many countries to
impose a temporary shutdown of their economy resulting in lower economic activity, a sharp increase in un-
employment, for example, in the United States (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020), and thereby to sinking income,
which might have unforeseeable effects on food demand. While the aforementioned aspects might influence the
impact of an export ban, they may in turn also be a driver of the decision to ban exports. In particular, consumers'
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panic purchases could cause governments to prohibit exports of these goods to avoid the danger of running out of
stocks of certain commodities in the short‐term. Hence, the causal effect could be reversed.
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